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iii. 
The appellant, Eryck C. Aston, files this Brief in reply 
to the Brief of Bruno D' Aston, and in support of Eryck7 s request 
that this Court quash the Writ of Execution issued by the District 
Court, vacate the district court' s Order and Decree issued pursuant 
to the Writ, and direct that all of the property seized from Eryck 
pursuant to the Writ be redelivered to Eryck, or in the 
alternative, to the Court for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
I. THE WRIT OF EXECUTION SHOULD BE QUASHED, THE ORDER REVERSED 
AND THE SEIZED PROPERTY RETURNED TO ERYCK. 
The Writ of Execution and the subsequent Order and Decree 
entered pursuant to the Writ by Judge Harding are void, ipso facto, 
as a result of the reversal of the underlying Decree of Divorce 
between Bruno and Dorothy in D' Aston v. D' Aston, 136 U. A. R. 4 7 (Ut. 
Ct. A. 1990). 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Execution, §12; 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal 
and Error, §955, 956; Restatement Judgments, 2d, §16; 
Comment C to the Res taternent Judgments, 2d, §16, states in 
part: 
"If, when the earlier judgment is set aside or reversed, 
the latter judgment is still subject to a post-judgment 
motion for a new trial or the like, or is still open on 
appeal, ... a party may inform the trial or appellate court 
of the nullification of the earlier judgment and the 
consequent elimination of the basis of the later 
judgment. The court should then normally set aside the 
later judgment.11 (emphasis added. ) 
Utah has recognized this general rule in several cases, including 
Phebus v. Dunford, 198 P. 2d 973 (Utah 1948) and Kellv v. Scott, 298 
P. 2d 821 (Utah 1956). Applications of the rule in cases involving 
execution proceedings flowing out of overturned judgments are found 
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in Zurich Insurance v. Bonebrake, 320 P. 2d 975 (Colo. 1958); Lohman 
v. Lohman, 246 S. W. 2d 368 (Mo. 1952) (involving a writ of execution 
issued on a divorce decree which was reversed). None of these 
cases were addressed or distinguished by Bruno. They each stand 
for the proposition that, in this case, the writ of execution 
should be quashed and the property returned to Eryck. 
Rule 69, U. R. C. P. begins by stating that "Process to 
enforce a judgment shall be by a writ of execution. " A judgment is 
the life blood of a Writ of Execution. A Writ is the mechanism to 
enforce the judgment. Without the underlying judgment, all 
proceedings subsequent to the judgment which were engaged in in 
reliance upon the judgment are ipso facto void and of no effect. 
38 Am. Jur. 2d, Execution §12. 
This Court stated in reversing the trial court in the 
underlying divorce proceeding (136 U. A. R. at 49): 
In summary, we reverse the trial court' s property 
distribution and remand for enforcement of the 1973 
postnuptial property agreement and then the division of 
the remaining property, if any, not controlled by it. 
Bruno argues that the reversal of the property settlement 
between Dorothy and Bruno does not affect Judge Harding' s decision 
in these post judgment proceedings, asserting that the "narrowly 
worded reversal" of the divorce decree would not affect Judge 
Harding' s determination that the codns seized from Eryck belong to 
Bruno. This argument ignores the very essence of the reversal 
which opens all issues regarding ownership by Bruno of any personal 
property. In his memorandum decision, Judge Harding awarded Bruno 
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only the coins which fell in two categories: (1) those with an "A" 
and (2) those contained on lists attached to the divorce decree. 
(R. 2238) Now with the reversal of the decree of divorce, the 
second category is eliminated. The first category contains only 13 
coins. 
The testimony at the first trial was that some of the 
real property given to Dorothy under the post-nuptial agreement was 
sold as early as 1973, with the proceeds from the sale being used 
by Bruno to invest in coins from various dealers and mints, to 
purchase coins for Dorothy, and to generally pay for Bruno' s 
expenses in purchasing and investing in coins. (Pages 766-777 of 
the transcript from the trial between Dorothy and Bruno. ) Upon 
remand, the trial court will be faced with an enormous task in 
tracing and determining ownership of many coins. It is entirely 
possible that upon remand every coin seized from Eryck pursuant to 
the Writ of Execution will be determined not to belong to Bruno, 
but to Dorothy or Eryck. 
Judge Park never determined "ownership" of the coins in 
the divorce proceedings. (Finding 17; R. 462-465. ) Judge Park 
never determined that any of the coins allegedly taken by Eryck and 
Dorothy had ever actually been owned by Bruno. (R. 454-465) Judge 
Park never determined that coins had actually been taken. (Findings 
8, 9, 20; R. 457, 458, 464. ) Judge Park never determined that a 
"consignment" had occurred. (Finding 8, 9, 12; R. 457, 458. ) Any 
coins awarded by Judge Park to Bruno were awarded by the decree 
(now reversed) subject to Dorothy's interest. (R. 457-465) Judge 
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Park simply divided property, ciwarding the coins to Bruno. That 
award was used in these proceedings by Bruno as the evidence of his 
ownership. The underpinnings for the presumption that Bruno "owns" 
the coins listed in the Decree has been removed by the reversal of 
the divorce decree. 
In support of his contention that the reversal of the 
divorce decree does not affect these proceedings, Bruno relies upon 
the inapposite Montana cases, Aye v. Fix, 626 P. 2d 1259 (Mont. 
1981) (and its predecessor.) In Aye, the Montana Supreme Court 
determined that its reversal of an earlier decision in the same 
matter had not affected the trial court* s findings on other facts 
which were involved in the subsequent appeal. Judge Park' s prior 
decree which awarded coins to Bruno was the focus of the 
proceedings which are now on appeal. That decree has been reversed 
and remanded. It cannot be said that Judge Park' s award of the 
coins to Bruno was a "collateral" issue. Without the decree of 
divorce, not only is there no basis for the Writ of Execution, 
there is also no evidence from Bruno of ownership of the seized 
property. 
In Point II of his Memorandum, Bruno asks this court to 
presume that all of the coins listed in the decree were his 
separate property under the post-nuptial agreement, and will remain 
his after remand of the divorce proceedings. This argument asks 
this court to ignore the fact that real property owned by Dorothy 
was sold and the proceeds of those sales loaned or otherwise given 
to Bruno to purchase coins and invest in other items of personal 
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property. This Court cannot assume anything about future rulings 
in the divorce proceedings. This Court is not in a position to 
apply the post-nuptial agreement to the facts of this case. 
Ownership of all of the personal property, including some of the 
property seized, remains to be determined. 
Bruno argues, (page 8), that "once awarded to Bruno, the 
coins would still arguably be subject to division by Judge Park in 
the remanded divorce proceeding between Bruno and Dorothy D' Aston. " 
This argument assumes a result in both the past and future divorce 
proceedings favorable to Bruno, i.e., that the coins were and are 
owned by Bruno. This argument highlights the intertwining of the 
reversed divorce decree and this subsequent hearing. While the 
allegedly stolen coins might include coins awarded to Bruno by the 
divorce decree, those issues are now open and there still has been 
no determination that the listed coins are or ever were Bruno7 s. 
Bruno argues that the proceedings between Bruno and Eryck were 
based on the complaint, and not on the writ. This contention is 
made without any reference to the record. The Order which is the 
subject of this appeal recites that 
"Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause against co-
defendant Eric D'Aston and plaintiffs' Motion for 
an Order direct the delivery of certain personal 
property to plaintiff came on regularly for hearing 
before the Hon. Ray M. Harding..." (R. 2325). 
The hearing was not one based on the complaint. As the order 
states, the hearing was based upon an order issued pursuant to a 
now reversed divorce decree. 
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There has never been any showing before either Judge 
Harding or Judge Park that (i) any of the coins awarded to Bruno by 
Judge Park in the Divorce Decree were owned by Bruno (ii) that any 
of the coins would be determined to be Bruno' s under the post 
nuptial agreement between Bruno and Dorothy, or (iii) that any of 
the seized coins were Bruno' s apart from Judge Harding' s reliance 
on the lists which were made a part of the reversed decree of 
divorce. (R. 473-538) 
The Order and Writ of Execution which gave rise to these 
proceedings should be quashed. Restatement Judgments 2d, §16. 
II. 
ERYCK WAS DENIED A FULL AND PAIR TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF 
OWNERSHIP OF THE SEIZED COINS. 
The proceedings before Judge Harding were not plenary. As 
discussed in the opening brief (p. 10-13), Eryck was denied the 
opportunity to present evidence attacking the merits of Bruno' s 
claims of ownership of coins, based upon Judge Hardings' 
determination that ownership of the coins listed in the exhibits to 
the decree (now reversed) was fixed by the prior proceedings. (T. 
4-5) In his Reply Brief, Bruno has not even attempted to argue 
that the proceedings before Judge Harding were plenary. 
The limited nature of the hearing before Judge Harding 
was advanced both by the Court and Bruno. (R. 2067, 2130, 2186.) 
Judge Harding made it abundantly clear to the parties that the 
evidence which he would consider was limited by the Decree. For 
example, the trial court stated at the outset that: 
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And the Court will hear no testimony on the 
issue of whether or not the consigned coins are the 
property of the plaintiff as that issue was decided 
by Judge Park. (T. 4-5. ) 
The clearest example of the limited nature of the 
proceedings occurred in connection with coins which Bruno claimed 
to have obtained by consignment. During the divorce proceeding, 
Bruno testified that he had coins from two consignments, one from 
Michael Graham' s company "1841" and a second consignment from Al 
Schafer. (R. 538, 531-33, 536-37. ) Bruno acknowledged to Judge 
Harding in these proceedings that the consignment from Al Schafer 
was not a consignment. (T. 225. ) Bruno' s sole evidence of 
11
 ownership" of many of the coins which were seized pursuant to the 
Writ was the purported consignments. 
Later, when Eryck attempted to introduce the testimony of 
Michael Graham regarding the coins and bullion that Bruno claimed 
to have obtained on consignment from Graham, Judge Harding limited 
the use of Graham's testimony to impeachment purposes only and 
refused to consider Graham' s testimony as evidence of the fact that 
no consignment had occurred. (Tr. 4-7, 498, 499) Graham' s 
testimony that no consignment had occurred was a statement against 
Graham' s own interest. It clearly undermined Bruno' s claim that he 
had obtained any coins from Graham by consignment. Apart from the 
alleged consignments and the Decree of Divorce, Bruno presented no 
other evidence in support of his burden of proving ownership of the 
significant number of coins covered by the consignments. (Exhibits 
24 to the Decree of Divorce, R. 529) 
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In limiting the use of Graham' s testimony, the trial 
court apparently applied principals of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel to limit the evidence and issues which it would consider. 
This collateral estoppel effect is reflected at length in the 
court' s Findings of Fact, in particular numbers 1, 9, 19 and 21. 
(R. 2319-2322.) Bruno does not dispute the proposition that the 
basis for res judicata or collateral estoppel is a final judgment. 
46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments §457; Smith v. Smith, 793 P. 2d 407, 409 
(Utah App. 1990). In this action, where there is no longer any 
final judgment because the decree of divorce has been reversed, 
there remains no legal support for Judge Hardings application of 
principals of collateral estoppel or res judicata and the resulting 
exclusion of evidence. 
The significance of the exclusion of evidence and the 
absence of collateral estoppel based on the reversal of the divorce 
decree is twofold. Initially, in an ordinary conversion 
proceeding, the party alleging conversion has the burden of proving 
his ownership of the allegedly converted property "with reasonable 
certainty". In this proceeding, Bruno's only proof of ownership of 
the consigned coins was the now reversed decree of divorce. 
Secondly, the court denied Eryck the opportunity to prove that no 
consignment from Graham to Bruno had ever occurred. 
This circumstance also highlights the overall short fall 
of Bruno' s proof. Judge Harding merely required Bruno to show that 
the coins were contained on the lists attached to the divorce 
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decree. Judge Harding apparently concluded himself that beyond the 
lists, Bruno's testimony was not truthful. (R. 2238) 
Now that the decree of divorce (including the lists) has 
been reversed, the lists can no longer prove "with reasonable 
certainty" Bruno' s ownership of the coins listed in the exhibits to 
the divorce decree. 
In point III of his Reply Memorandum, Bruno argues that 
Eryck was not prejudiced by an exclusion of the deposition of 
Michael Graham on the basis that the trial court did "not wholly 
exclude the deposition" of Michael Graham. (Brief, p. 13) This 
assertion ignores the court' s statement that it would consider the 
deposition for impeachment purposes only (T. 499) and assumes that 
Judge Harding ignored his own ruling and considered the testimony 
of Graham for the truth of the matters it addressed. Such an 
assumption is not warranted. 
Had the trial court considered Graham' s testimony as 
evidence on the matters on which Graham testified, coupled with the 
Court' s own statements regarding the lack of truthfulness of 
Bruno' s testimony, the result as to a significant number of the 
coins would certainly have been different. Apart from the lists of 
allegedly consigned coins which were a part of the decree of 
divorce, Bruno offered no evidence to meet his burden of proof 
regarding ownership of the consigned coins. It is not possible to 
conclude that the Courts refusal to consider Graham' s testimony was 
harmless error. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 
740 P. 2d 1296 (Utah 1988. ) 
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Under the standards of Rule 61, U. R. C. P. , the trial 
court' s reliance upon the Decree and its limitation of evidence, 
particularly regarding the consigned coins, constitutes reversible 
error. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING BRUNO ATTORNEYS FEES 
In its Memorandum of Costs (R. 2241 and 2242), Bruno 
included a claim for attorneys fees paid to an Oregon law firm in 
connection with the deposition of Michael Graham. Eryck objected 
to the inclusion of this item as a cost, but the district court 
awarded the attorneys fees as costs. The inclusion of attorneys 
fees in the judgment for costs was error. Frampton v. Wilson. 605 
P. 2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980). 
In support of the court' s inclusion of the fees in the 
award, Bruno relies upon an Arizona case, Citv of Kingman v. 
Havatone, 485 P. 2d 574 (1971). The Arizona case involved a last 
minute deposition taken out of state where the court, as a factor 
in permitting the deposition to proceed, required the party 
desiring to take the deposition to pay the travel expenses (but not 
the attorneys fees) for the opposing counsel. There was also an 
order awarding the cost entered prior to the deposition under Rule 
30(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. No such pre-
deposition order was made in the present case. The City of Kingman 
case does not stand for the proposition that attorneys fees are 
appropriate as an item of costs in this case. 
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Bruno argues that the judgment for costs has been 
voluntarily satisfied. In fact, the judgment for costs was not 
voluntarily satisfied as set forth in the correspondence of 
counsel. (Exhibit •'1" attached. ) Payment of the cost judgment was 
made under threat of execution. For this reason alone, the payment 
was not voluntary. IBM v. Lawhorn, 677 P. 2d 507 (Id. A. 1984) The 
case of Jacobsen, Morrin and Robbins Construction Co. v. St. Joseph 
High School. 794 P. 2d 505 (Utah Ct. A. 1990) does not apply to the 
non-voluntary payment which was made in this case. 
IV. 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ITS INCLUSION OF 
CERTAIN ITEMS OF PROPERTY IN THE DECREE AND POST-TRIAL ORDERS. 
The Findings by the trial court, as articulated in its 
Memorandum Decision dated January 31, 1990, were very limited in 
nature. The Decision itself makes frequent references to 
"reasonable inference". This somewhat amorphous and perhaps new 
level of proof falls far short of the burden of proof discussed in 
Burgess v. Small, 117 A. 2d 344 (Me. 1955) and far short even of the 
authorities cited by Bruno in his Reply Brief. No authority has 
been offered to this court by Bruno to suggest that a "reasonable 
inference" is anything more than mere conjecture. 
Perhaps the most disturbing finding entered by the court 
is that contained in paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact (R. 2317, 
2318) which states that: 
Some of those items, while not exceptionally 
rare, would not be expected to appear in an average 
coin shop. 
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There was absolutely no evidence in the record to support this 
finding. Bruno has proposed none in his Brief. The only testimony 
on this subject was that of Al Rust, Eryck' s expert, who testified 
to the exact opposite fact, i. e. , that all of the coins on the list 
were readily available in coin stores. (T. 462-472) This 
testimony, and the clearly erroneous finding to the contrary, when 
coupled with the court's findings made by "reasonable inference", 
casts an overwhelming shadow of doubt upon the court' s own 
application of the burden of proof to the facts which it claims to 
have determined. 
Another revealing factor in the court' s Memorandum 
Decision was its conclusion that the testimony of both parties 
lacked truthfulness. (R. 2238. ) How can Bruno sustain a burden of 
proof of "reasonable certainty" with untruthful testimony? 
The court ultimately awarded Bruno only those coins which 
fell within two categories: (1) those bearing an "A" stamp and (2) 
those coins which matched items listed on the plaintiff s first 
list of stolen property given to the police (Exhibit 57). (R. 
2239. ) Because of the Court' s conclusion that Bruno' s testimony 
was untruthful there is, in the record, no legal basis to support 
the award of property beyond those coins with stamped "A's" and 
those listed in the decree. The significance of this limited 
determination is that even if we were to assume that coins had been 
taken, Bruno would still bear the burden of proving that they were 
those seized, and that he owned them. Bruno' s proof of ownership 
must be based upon the strength of his own evidence and not upon 
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the weakness of Eryck' s evidence. Eaaert v. Vincent, 723 P. 2d 527 
(Wash. 1986). Considered in the most extreme application, Eryck 
could have failed to appear for the hearing and Bruno would have 
still had the obligation to prove with "reasonable certainty" that 
the coins before the court were his. As to many items, Bruno 
presented no evidence of ownership. 
Bruno accuses Eryck of an improper marshalling of the 
evidence regarding certain items of personal property which were 
improperly included by Bruno in orders prepared for the court' s 
signature subsequent to the trial court' s memorandum decision. In 
over seven pages of his opening brief, (P. 19-26) Eryck marshalled 
evidence ostensibly supportive of the Findings reached by the 
court. Many of the statements regarding the evidence contained in 
Bruno' s Memorandum on pages 16 and 17 are actually discussed in 
Eryck' s Brief. For example, Eryck marshalled the same evidence on 
the peace dollars and the "A" stamped on their rim on page 22 at 
paragraph 14e of his brief as was advanced by Bruno in his brief. 
Many of the alleged "facts" marshalled by Bruno are 
inaccurate (Brief, p. 16-17): 
1. Bruno claims that Eryck' s collection at the time of 
the divorce trial had a value of only $5,000.00, 
citing to pages 377 and 517 of the transcript of 
that trial. Those pages make no reference to the 
value of Eryck' s collection. 
- 13 -
2. Eryck' s witnesses made no specific reference to the 
amount of money which would be necessary to acquire 
his inventory. (T. 4 79) 
While other specific discrediting is possible, the point 
remains that many of the specific items which Bruno included in 
orders which he subsequently prepared for the Court were items 
which were either (a) beyond those awarded to him by the memorandum 
decision, or (b) items which Bruno clearly stated in his own 
testimony could not be identified as having been owned by him. 
Based upon the court' s Findings and its Memorandum 
Decision, plaintiff' s counsel was instructed to prepare Findings, 
Conclusions and a Judgment "consistent with the terms of this 
Decision". (R. 2240) From that point forward, the list of coins 
which Bruno claimed were covered under the Memorandum Decision 
continued to grow. It is those additional coins and items which 
are the subject of Eryck's discussion (p. 29) that the District 
Court committed error in its inclusion of certain items of property 
in subsequent Orders. 
JL The 18. 5 gram gold nugget. 
The gold nugget did not bear a stamped "A". The 18.5 
gold gram nugget was not listed on the police list. (Tr. Exh. 57) 
The trial court, having determined that Bruno was entitled only to 
those items included on the police list or bearing the stamped "A" 
(R. 2239), was led into error by Bruno in his inclusion of the 18. 5 
gram gold nugget in subsequent orders. 
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EL The 84 Common Date BU~Dollars and 60 Common Date CIRC-Dollars 
(R. 2328). 
There was absolutely no evidence before the trial court 
to support any finding or conclusion that the 84 Common Date BU 
(brilliant uncirculated) and 60 common date CIRC (circulated) 
dollars listed in subsequent orders were the same coins alluded to 
in the police list. Bruno has offered no reference to the record 
to support the award of these coins to Bruno. Bruno testified that 
(T. 204) circulated dollars are not identifiable, and that no one 
can possibly identify common coins. (T. 241) The court must act 
upon the evidence which is presented to it. There is absolutely no 
evidence to tie these particular coins to the coins listed in the 
police report. 
£L The Consigned Coins. 
These coins are discussed previously. Bruno offers no 
evidence from the record apart from the prior decree of divorce to 
support the court7 s inclusion of these items in the award. 
Based on the foregoing circumstances, coupled with the 
trial court' s express reliance upon the now reversed and remanded 
Decree of Divorce, this matter should be reversed, the Writ quashed 
and the property returned to Eryck. 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FIXING THE 
SUPERSEDEAS BOND. 
Subsequent to the trial and after the appeal had been 
filed, Eryck filed a motion with the District Court requesting that 
the court establish a supersedeas bond to hold the property in 
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place during the pendency of the appeal. In support of the motion,, 
Eryck filed an affidavit setting forth his opinion that the value 
of the coins awarded to his father by the Order and Decree did not 
exceed $31,000 in value. In his opening Brief, Eryck contended 
that there had been no evidence during the course of the hearing on 
the value of the property and that the only evidence before the 
court with respect to the value of the coins awarded to Bruno was 
Eryck' s affidavit. 
In his Reply Memorandum, Bruno contends that the court 
did not abuse its discretion and that there had been extensive and 
widely varying evidence concerning value presented at trial. 
Specifically, Bruno refers to transcript pages 155, 190, 499, 461 
and 472 as places in the record supporting the court7 s 
determination of the supersedeas bond. Not one of the pages 
referred to contains any reference to the value of coins before the 
court. Bruno's own post hearing affidavit on the subject was 
excluded. (R. 2417„ ) Apart from Eryck's affidavit, there is no 
evidence regarding the overall value of the seized coins. There 
has been no evidence pointed to by Bruno which supports such an 
enormous amount for the supersedeas bond. 
Even if there had been some other evidence of the value 
of the property, the correct measure for the trial court to have 
considered in establishing the bond was the potential change in 
value of the property during the pendency of the appeal. 5 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Appeal & Error, §1058. The court' s determination that a 
$150,000 bond was adequate is no different then a statement that a 
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$1 million bond would have been adequate. Both amounts are 
adequate, but also grossly excessive. Neither number is based on 
evidence actually before the court regarding the potential for the 
change in value during the pendency of the appeal. 
Bruno argues that issues regarding the supersedeas bond 
are not before this court because a separate notice of appeal was 
not filed. (Bruno's brief, p. 20) No legal authority is cited in 
support of this assertion by Bruno, and this court should decline 
to consider this contention. State v. Wareham, 772 P. 2d 960 (Utah 
1989); State v. Salata, 155 U. A. R. 23 at 25 (Ut. Ct. A. 1991). 
Bruno argues that the error in fixing the bond was 
harmless. It is not. When this matter is remanded for further 
proceedings, it is likely that the District Court will require some 
bond to hold the property before the court during the pendency of 
further proceedings. In that instance, the trial court should be 
instructed that it should not automatically establish a bond in the 
amount of $150,000, since that amount is not supported by the 
record. 
VI. 
THIS APPEAL IS NOT MOOT. 
Bruno suggests that the appeal in this matter is moot 
because he was able to take from the court all of the coins which 
were awarded to him by the trial court' s decision. The only reason 
that this occurred was because Eryck was unable to post a 
supersedeas bond to hold the property in place. After Bruno had 
taken all of the property which the clerk would give him pursuant 
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to the trial court' s orders, the clerk was still left with some 
coins which had not been addressed by any order of the court. At 
this time, the parties entered into a stipulation which stated in 
part as follows: 
WHEREAS, the parties have been instructed by 
the court and the clerk to remove the property from 
the court, and 
WHEREAS, the parties have each expended 
considerable sums in advancing their positions 
before the court and are desirous of avoiding 
further expense in connection with those items, and 
WHEREAS, the parties are willing to enter into 
an agreement only upon the condition that all of 
their rights, claims and objections be preserved 
both before the trial court and on appeal, 
including each party' s claim that the other is 
entitled to take nothing from the court, and 
WHEREAS, the parties understand and agree that 
this Stipulation is not intended by either to 
constitute a satisfaction of the judgment or waiver 
of any claim of any type, 
NOW THEREFORE. . . 
This Stipulation was signed by counsel, an order was entered and 
the remaining coins released. (The Stipulation was filed 9/11/90 
and is Exhibit "E" to Bruno's Memorandum in Support of Suggestion 
of Mootness filed in this Court. ) 
Bruno' s suggestion that this agreement renders the appeal 
moot is both contrary to the written agreement and without legal 
basis. When this court reverses the trial court' s decision, Bruno 
will be accountable to the Court and to Eryck for all of the coins 
which were improperly seized, including those which were awarded to 
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Bruno. First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, 653 P. 2d 
591 (Utah 1980). 
As recited in the stipulation, the parties had been 
instructed by the court and the clerk to remove the property from 
the court. Contrary to the Cinaolani v. Utah Power & Light Co., 
790 P. 2d 1219 (Utah Ct. A. 1990) case relied upon by Bruno, the 
parties in this action specifically dealt with the protection of 
their relative positions both before the trial court and on appeal. 
The stipulation was not a settlement or agreement on any legal 
issue. It was complying with the demands of the court that the 
property be removed. 
Bruno also relies upon a statement contained in 
correspondence from Eryck' s counsel to the court that "there is no 
question once they [the coins] are released to either Eryck Aston 
or Bruno Aston that they simply will not be recovered" as 
supporting his suggestion of mootness. The statement in the letter 
was directed to Bruno Aston' s perceived dishonesty and not to any 
legal principle. Bruno Aston' s counsel has now advised Judge Park 
in the Fourth District Court that they have lost contact with Bruno 
and have requested to be able to withdraw from representing Bruno 
in further proceedings before Judge Park. The perception 
contained in the letter has apparently been borne out. 
If this court were to go along with Bruno's suggestion 
that this appeal is moot, this court would in effect be stating 
that a judgment creditor (Bruno) is free to swoop down upon a third 
party (Eryck) based upon a Writ of Execution issued ex parte 
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pursuant to a judgment (now reversed), seize the third person's 
property, take the seized property from the court because the third 
person has been rendered unable to post a bond, and leave the third 
person (Eryck) with no avenue of appeal. What Bruno is really 
asking this court to say is that because Eryck was unable to post 
bond that he cannot have an appeal. This suggestion is not one of 
mootness. The suggestion is one of over-reaching and the denial of 
due process. Such a broad result is inappropriate and would leave 
those harmed the most unable to appeal. Fed. Proc. L. Ed. §3:631. 
Involuntary compliance with court orders does not render the appeal 
moot. I_d. ; McDaniel v. Jones, 679 P. 2d 682 (Kan. 1984* ) 
This matter is not a mere intellectual exercise. The 
appeal is one seeking to unwind an execution on a judgment which 
has now been reversed. This appeal should be considered on the 
merits. The issues on appeal are not moot. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order and Decree of the District Court dated March 9, 
1990 (R. 2325) and all subsequent orders issued pursuant thereto, 
should be reversed with all of the seized property being returned 
to Eryck. 
DATED this day of May, 1991. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
_i/ 
Keith W. Meade 
Attorney for appellant 
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intended to execute on the judgment and was made to save the cost 
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